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Non-Technical Summary 
In many industrialised countries, about half of GDP goes through the hands of 
government. Against this backdrop, the expenditure side of public budgets is 
gaining greater attention, particularly with respect to the quality of public fi-
nances. Contributing to the debate how the expenditure side can support eco-
nomic performance, this paper adopts a case study approach and takes a close 
look at real policy examples and concrete experiences with expenditure reforms 
in industrialised countries.  
‘Ambitious reformers’ among OECD countries are identified on the basis of re-
ductions in the GDP ratio of primary spending that amount to or exceed 5% of 
GDP over seven years, starting with the year of maximum total expenditure in 
relation to GDP. The resulting sample of ambitious reformers comprises eight 
countries in two ‘reform waves’: Ireland, Belgium, the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands reduced their expenditure ratios as of the early 1980s and, with the 
exception of Belgium, marshalled a second ambitious reform effort in the early 
1990s. This second wave was joined by Finland, Sweden, Canada and Spain. 
Countries that reduced their primary spending ratio by less than 5% of GDP are 
defined as ‘timid reformers’. This ‘control group’ consists of Austria (borderline 
to ambitious), Denmark, New Zealand, the United States, Italy, Japan, Belgium 
in the 1990s, Germany, France and Switzerland. 
The study examines each ambitious reform case individually and collects its 
main contextual facts with respect to the macroeconomic environment, the scope 
and composition of the expenditure reduction, important institutional compo-
nents of the reform effort as well as complementary measures. The latter illus-
trate the comprehensiveness of reforms, including liberalisation and privatisa-
tion in the labour, product and services markets as well as far-reaching tax re-
forms. 
From a horizontal perspective and on the basis of comparing unweighted aver-
ages of early (reforms in 1980s) and late (reforms in 1990s) ambitious vs. timid 
reformers, the study discerns a number of important features of expenditure re-
forms. Within seven years, ambitious reform countries reduced total expendi-
tures by around 10% of GDP. While both ambitious and timid reformers benefit 
from falling interest payments, these reductions amount to 50% of the overall 
expenditure decline in timid countries but to only 10% of the savings achieved 
by ambitious ones. Ambitious reformers focus their efforts on the reduction of 
public consumption (wages and employment), transfers and subsidies. On aver-
age, over 80% of the decline in their primary expenditure ratios occurs in these 
categories. Public investment was cut strongly by the group of early ambitious 
  
reformers but only moderately by the other two groups. Education spending was 
touched little in the reform process for all groups. 
In all cases, ambitious expenditure reform was part of a comprehensive agenda 
that changed countries’ economic policy regime significantly. Reforms included 
in most cases improved fiscal institutional, labour market incentives, taxation, 
privatisation and other measures to enhance macroeconomic stability. 
The study also compares the performance of both the early and late ‘ambitious’ 
vs. the ‘timid’ reformers in terms of medium-term economic developments. 
Ambitious expenditure reform episodes coincided with more profound im-
provements in the soundness of public finances than timid ones and yielded sig-
nificant scope for tax cuts. Furthermore, countries that undertook ambitious ex-
penditure reforms experienced more favourable trend output developments. The 
study provides some evidence that positive confidence effects of ambitious ex-
penditure reforms were potentially strong and coincided with a quick rebound in 
growth.  
While the experiences of the two country groups are significantly different (as 
suggested by relevant statistical tests), the study does not establish causality be-
tween reform ambition and performance in an econometric sense, for which 
much further analysis would be warranted.  
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1 Introduction 
Public expenditure in industrialised countries stands at very high levels. In 
Europe, in particular, almost half of GDP is going through the hands of govern-
ment. At the same time, the data exhibit enormous cross-country divergence in 
terms of both expenditure levels and trends in recent decades. Many countries 
reported public spending well above 50% of GDP at some point over the past 25 
years, with maxima above 60% in the Nordic countries and Belgium. By con-
trast, a number of countries have never reported spending ratios in excess of 
40% of GDP, notably the US, Japan, Australia or Switzerland. Moreover, in re-
cent years, a number of countries have reversed very high spending ratios 
through ambitious expenditure reforms while others also retreated from earlier 
peaks, albeit in a much more timid fashion. 
This paper takes a close look at experiences with expenditure reform in industri-
alised countries and places special emphasis on ambitious reform episodes. It 
conducts a comparative in-depth analysis of such episodes by examining the 
concrete reform measures undertaken and their effect on total spending and ex-
penditure composition. It also looks at the institutional context in which these 
reforms were undertaken, the comprehensiveness of reform programs and the 
economic and fiscal performance of these countries in the wake of such reforms.  
The study has its conceptual underpinning in the literature on fiscal policies, 
growth and sustainability. Very high spending in many industrialised countries 
has, according to many observers, significant adverse consequences on em-
ployment, investment and innovation. Large bureaucracies and benefit systems 
that discourage labour supply as well as high effective and marginal tax rates 
tend to discourage work and capital formation and stifle entrepreneurial and 
technological dynamism. High spending is also correlated with persistent defi-
cits and debt increases as well as significant future liabilities related to popula-
tion ageing. This threatens to put at risk the sustainability of public finances. If 
expenditure reforms enhance the efficiency of spending and reduce unproduc-
tive spending commitments, disincentives are reduced, taxes can be lowered and 
fiscal imbalances lastingly eliminated. The beneficial effects of expenditure re-
forms can be reinforced if they are conducted as part of a comprehensive reform 
program where macroeconomic or structural bottle-necks elsewhere in the econ-
omy are eliminated at the same time.2  
                                           
2  For surveys, see Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000 and 2003; Hemming, Kell and Mahfouz., 
2002; Afonso, Ebert, Schuknecht and Thoene, 2005; European Commission, 2003 and 
2004; EPC Ageing Report, 2006; Wierts, 2006; ECOFIN 2006. The literature has also 
found that expenditure-based consolidations tend to be more successful in improving debt 
dynamics than revenue increases (Alesina and Perotti, 1995). 
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The literature points to the possibility of strongly positive effects of expenditure 
reform in the medium to long run. These effects can be magnified if fiscal re-
forms are complemented by macroeconomic stabilisation and structural reforms 
in factor and product markets. The literature has also been putting increasing 
emphasis on the “institutional infrastructure” or “the rules of the game” of eco-
nomic policy making that set the right incentives for policy makers, including in 
the fiscal sphere. If expenditure and other macroeconomic, institutional and 
structural reforms result in a deep change of the policy regime and break expec-
tations of rent-seeking opportunities and repeated policy errors, then these re-
forms should result in improved economic performance at least in the medium 
term. Additionally, it is by now well known that expenditure reform and re-
trenchment may even have positive short term effects on demand if changes in 
expectations take hold quickly and generate strong confidence effects from an-
ticipated higher wealth and lower taxes. This is another way of phrasing in more 
technical terms what would happen if a fundamental reform programme causes a 
profound change in the economic policy regime of a country.3  
This study focuses mainly on medium to long term aspects of expenditure re-
forms. It builds on and extends a recent study by Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005), 
which takes a bird’s eye view on the different experiences that OECD countries 
have made since the early 1980s with reducing public expenditure. The authors 
find in particular that ambitious expenditure reforms have coincided with 
strengthened economic growth as well as socio-economic and institutional indi-
cators. A forthcoming case study conducted by the IMF (Annett 2006) pursues 
an approach similar to ours while focussing on labour market issues. Its findings 
are consistent with the results of this paper and, in a complementary way, also 
point to the need for comprehensive reforms that encompass structural measures 
as well as expenditure-based fiscal consolidation. 
Ambitious reform programs as defined in this paper display a number of com-
mon features: the reduction in total spending is indeed ambitious and averages 
about 10% of GDP within seven years. It is achieved by focusing mainly on 
government consumption, transfers and subsidies, while mostly protecting edu-
cation spending and, often, public investment. Ambitious expenditure reform 
comes as part and parcel of a comprehensive reform package, mostly including 
labour market reform, tax reform and privatisation as well as, in about half of 
the episodes, the establishment of monetary and external stability. Virtually all 
                                           
3  For a discussion of the importance of changes in the rules of the game or the policy regime 
change, see Brennan and Buchanan (1985) from a conceptual perspective and Tanzi and 
Schuknecht (2000) for applications in the expenditure domain to Chile and New Zealand. 
Fiscal rules are discussed in von Hagen, Hallerberg and Strauch (2004); or Deroose and 
Wierts (2006). For surveys of the Non-Keynesian effects literature, see McDermott and 
Wescott (1997); or Briotti (2005). 
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episodes of ambitious reform feature a significant strengthening of national and 
sub-national budgetary procedures and institutions. For many of the episodes 
discussed, it appears that one could indeed talk about a major change in the pol-
icy regime. 
Ambitious reform episodes appear to coincide with more lasting fiscal consoli-
dation than “timid” expenditure reforms while also yielding an important “tax 
cut dividend”. Ambitious reformers also experience a considerably more favour-
able growth performance than “timid” countries and small ambitious countries 
experience a stronger and faster increase in output growth. Ambitious reformers 
have also typically not experienced significant short term economic costs of re-
trenchment, despite an average adjustment effort of around 3% of GDP in the 
first two years of reform, as consumer and investor confidence picked up rather 
quickly.  
Before entering into the discussion, it is worth stressing that this study looks at 
the changes in spending ratios since their peak, their correlation with other re-
forms and the fiscal and economic performance of countries from a case study 
perspective. While the ambitious and timid groups’ experiences are significantly 
different (as suggested by relevant tests), we do not establish statistical causality 
between reforms and performance for which much further analysis would be 
warranted. While focusing on changes in expenditure ratios, the study does not 
comment on “optimal” levels of public spending ratios (on this issue, see the 
quoted work by Tanzi and Schuknecht).  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The second section pro-
vides a historic overview of expenditure trends followed by a methodological 
discussion of how to distinguish ambitious and timid reformers. Section three 
presents eight country case studies comprising 11 episodes of ambitious expen-
diture reform. The fourth section draws horizontal conclusions from the case 
studies and compares these with the economic and fiscal performance of timid 
reformers. The final section concludes. 
2 Expenditure trends and reform episodes in OECD coun-
tries 
2.1 A historical perspective on expenditure trends 
From a historic perspective, it is striking that, one century ago, public expendi-
ture absorbed only about 10% of GDP, with most spending going to the military 
and public investment. With World War I, the expenditure ratio rose to over 
20% of GDP and further to somewhat less than 30% by the early 1960s. This 
was the period when (apart from military spending during World War II), health, 
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education and other goods and services began to be financed publicly. After this, 
public spending growth accelerated when the modern welfare state was created 
and expanded. This increase affected all advanced economies, though to varying 
degrees. By the early 1980s, average public spending reached about 45% of 
GDP—four times as much as a century earlier. (For more details, see Tanzi and 
Schuknecht 2000 and Peacock and Wiseman 1961.)  
Since then, however, expenditure developments were rather diverse across in-
dustrialised countries as more and more countries started reforming their public 
finances and reducing public expenditure levels relative to GDP. The first coun-
tries where public expenditure peaked and subsequently started to decline were 
Luxembourg and the United Kingdom in 1981, followed by Ireland (1982), Bel-
gium and the Netherlands (1983) and Australia and New Zealand (1985). In a 
further large group of countries, public spending continued to increase until the 
early to mid-1990s and then started coming down. Only Greece and Portugal 
experienced their expenditure peaks in the past five years.  
This picture is reflected in Table 1. Comparing maximum expenditure ratios 
with most recently available data confirms a marked decline in public expendi-
ture ratios in many industrialised countries since its peak. The first two columns 
report the year when expenditure ratios peaked and the ratio for that year. The 
next two columns report the expenditure ratio in 2004 (or the latest available 
year) and the change since the peak. On average, total expenditures have fallen 
by 8% of GDP, the change being slightly higher in the euro area. The Table also 
clearly shows the two reform waves starting in the early 1980s and early 1990s, 
respectively. 
There are not only great differences in the starting year of expenditure reduction 
and reform but also in the intensity of the respective reform efforts. In some 
countries, including Belgium, Canada, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand and Sweden, expenditure fell by over 10 or even 20 percentage points 
of GDP. 
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Table 1: Total expenditure, maximum spending ratio, 2004 
Percent of GDP         
  Maximum public expenditure Change 
  Year ratio 2004 or nearest Maximum-2004 
     (% of GDP) 
Australia 1985 40.2 36.3 -3.9 
Austria 1993 57.4 50.4 -7.1 
Belgium  1983 63.8 50.2 -13.6 
Canada 1992 52.6 39.7 -13.0 
Denmark 1993 61.3 55.1 -6.2 
Finland 1993 64.8 51.5 -13.2 
France 1996 55.4 54.0 -1.3 
Germany 1996 50.2 47.5 -2.7 
Greece 2000 52.0 49.9 -2.1 
Ireland 1982 56.2 34.0 -22.2 
Italy 1993 57.7 48.6 -9.1 
Japan 1998 41.0 38.6 -2.5 
Luxembourg 1981 51.9 45.6 -6.3 
Netherlands 1983 58.3 47.1 -11.2 
New Zealand 1985 56.5 38.6 -17.9 
Portugal 2004 46.5 46.5 0.0 
Spain 1993 47.6 39.0 -8.6 
Sweden 1993 73.0 57.1 -16.0 
Switzerland 1998 34.8 34.3 -0.5 
United Kingdom 1981 50.7 44.1 -6.5 
United States 1992 37.2 34.3 -2.9 
        
Average   52.6 44.8 -7.8 
Euro zone   55.1 47.0 -8.1 
Non-euro OECD   49.7 42.0 -7.7 
   Source: Ameco 
In a number of others, public expenditure fell very little and even that fall was 
due to savings from lower inflation and interest on public debt rather than due to 
a structural consolidation effort. In some countries, public expenditure was rela-
tively low at the outset and hence the room for cuts much smaller (Australia, 
Switzerland, Japan, US). 
The average ratio of public spending to GDP is now more or less back to where 
it was in the early 1980s. However, the countries with the highest expenditure 
ratio today are mostly not the same as 20 years ago. In some countries, expendi-
ture reductions brought ratios back close to the average. In some others, public 
spending fell to levels that are close to what might be broadly considered “opti-
mal”: Ireland’s, Spain’s, New Zealand’s and Canada’s public spending is now 
below 40% of GDP and even near the ratio of 30-35% that Tanzi and Schuk-
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necht (2000) speculated to be the maximum necessary for financing essential 
and high quality public services.4 
2.2 Categorisation of countries by reform effort and timing 
In order to conduct an in-depth analysis of expenditure reform experiences, it is 
useful as a first step to propose some definitions and categorisation. This may 
then also facilitate discussing reform patterns, their context and their impact, e.g. 
with respect to the timing and intensity of reform. We define changes in the 
primary expenditure ratio (which is total expenditure excluding interest spend-
ing on public debt) as the measure of a country’s reform effort. This is a well-
accepted approach in the literature as it measures deviations between non-
interest expenditure developments and their main drivers (public wages, and so-
cial benefits) relative to nominal GDP.5 Nevertheless, we also use real expendi-
ture growth as a robustness check. Ideally one should look at cyclically adjusted 
expenditure ratios but due to limited data availability and concerns about data 
quality we use this data as another means to check robustness rather than as the 
primary assessment indicator. Finally, we did not only look at changes in the 
public expenditure ratio but also at relative changes, i.e. at the decline of public 
primary expenditure relative to total expenditure.  
Furthermore, we define the total expenditure peak of each country as the starting 
date of the expenditure reform period. We take stock of the change in the ex-
penditure ratio after 7 years, which is broadly the duration of observed reform 
“waves” (and adjustment fades out around this date) and which also roughly cor-
responds to the length of many business cycles (so that cyclical adjustment of 
expenditure developments becomes less important). This approach will later al-
low comparing and discussing the medium term experiences in the context of 
expenditure reforms. Again, we checked whether results were robust to different 
observation periods. For the countries that started reforming in the 1980s, we 
also checked whether they participated additionally in the second reform wave 
of the early 1990s. Some countries may hence feature two reform episodes. 
                                           
4  See Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) for arguing for industrialised countries that public spend-
ing increases have not brought much additional benefit when growing beyond 30% of 
GDP. Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005) show, for a large number of emerging econo-
mies, that expenditure efficiency appears to be declining strongly when the expenditure ra-
tio exceeds 30% or 35% of GDP. 
5  See, for example, the Non-Keynesian effects literature.  
 Note that wages and benefits are normally correlated with nominal GDP growth. A country 
with 4% nominal wage, benefit and GDP growth will need to make an effort to keep ex-
penditure growth below GDP growth just as a country with 5% or 6% growth in these ele-
ments. However, with high GDP growth it is easier to shrink the expenditure ratio without 
resorting to nominal spending cuts. 
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Table 2: Primary expenditure, changes 
Percent of GDP             
  Primary expenditure Change  Ranking   
  T0 (or nearest) maxT7      
  year ratio (or nearest)      
    (% of GDP) 
Relative 
(% of 
max) (% of GDP) 
Relative 
(% of 
max) 
"ambitious" reformers             
Finland 1993 60.3 -14.0 -23.2 1 2 
Sweden 1993 67.2 -14.0 -20.8 2 5 
Ireland (Phase 1) 1982 47.5 -12.4 -26.0 3 1 
Belgium (Phase 1) 1983 53.9 -12.3 -22.7 4 3 
Canada 1992 44.9 -9.5 -21.2 5 4 
United Kingdom 
(Phase 1) 1981 45.4 -8.2 -18.1 6 6 
Netherlands (Phase 2) 1993 48.5 -7.5 -15.4 7 9 
United Kingdom 
(Phase 2) 1992 44.3 -7.2 -16.2 8 7 
Spain 1993 42.6 -6.4 -15.0 9 10 
Ireland (Phase 2) 1992 38.2 -6.2 -16.1 10 8 
Luxembourg 1981 50.5 -5.7 -11.2 11 11 
Netherlands (Phase 1) 1983 52.8 -5.1 -9.7 12 13 
"timid" reformers            
Austria 1993 53.1 -4.3 -8.1 13 15 
Denmark 1993 54.1 -3.9 -7.2 14 17 
New Zealand 1985 46.9 -3.8 -8.2 15 14 
United States 1992 32.2 -3.4 -10.4 16 12 
Italy 1993 44.6 -3.0 -6.6 17 18 
Japan 1998 37.6 -2.7 -7.3 18 16 
Belgium (Phase 2) 1993 45.2 -2.1 -4.6 19 19 
Germany 1996 46.7 -0.6 -1.3 20 20 
France 1996 51.5 -0.5 -0.9 21 22 
Switzerland 1998 34.0 -0.3 -1.0 22 21 
other countries         23   
Portugal 2004 43.8 0.0 0.0 24 23 
Greece 2000 43.9 0.4 0.8 25 24 
Australia 1985 34.9 0.4 1.1 26 25 
 Source: Ameco 
The results of these considerations are reflected in Table 2 and in Annex Tables 
1 and 2. Of the 21 countries that we considered, six countries started reducing 
public spending in the 1980s, and four of them report two “waves” (Belgium, 
Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). This yields a total of 25 epi-
sodes or “cases”. Of these 25 cases, ten reported primary expenditure reductions 
of more than 6 percent of GDP and a relative decline of public spending of more 
than 15% of GDP within seven years. Moreover, there are two cases where pri-
mary expenditure declined by more than 5% of GDP, reflecting a relative de-
cline of about 10%. To put this in perspective, a 5% primary expenditure decline 
reflects about half of the public sector wage bill or more than half of public pen-
sion spending for the average of industrialised countries. To us, these cases 
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therefore reflect ambitious reform programs. Four of these are cases of “early” 
ambitious adjustment took place in the 1980s. The others are “late” ambitious 
programs, as they took place in the 1990s.6 When looking at real expenditure 
growth, all episodes feature contained positive or even negative growth in this 
variable with the notably exception of Ireland. However, the country was able to 
limit spending growth well below real GDP trend and still reported a remarkable 
decline in the cyclically adjusted expenditure ratio. Spain and the first Dutch 
reform episode show somewhat less expenditure consolidation when looking at 
cyclically adjusted figures. All in all, and despite these caveats, we would find 
our identification criterion as broadly reasonable and classify 12 (or almost half 
of the total) episodes as incidents of ambitious reforms. 
There are 10 cases of “timid” reforms whose public primary expenditure de-
clined but by less than 5% of GDP within seven years. This group also includes 
the large euro area countries. There are two countries where the choice of a 
longer adjustment period (than 7 years) would have made a difference and 
would have qualified them as “ambitious reformers” under the above definition. 
Austria is the least timid and comes close to the 5% threshold after 7 years. New 
Zealand is the country with the greatest overall adjustment effort between the 
start of reforms and today in this group.7 The US reports the highest relative ex-
penditure decline of about 10% of total primary spending in this group, coming 
close to that of Luxembourg or Netherlands (phase 1). However, most of the re-
duction occurred in the area of military spending. It also noteworthy that Ger-
many and Italy reported relatively moderate real expenditure growth but in an 
environment of low trend growth this did not translate into much reduced spend-
ing ratios. To be consequential, we included all these cases with some ‘border-
line characteristics’ in the group of timid reformers.  
Three countries did not experience any decline in primary spending ratios since 
the peak of total expenditure (Portugal, Greece, Australia). Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that these countries did not undertake economic policy reforms. 
Especially Australia undertook major structural reforms in the past two decades. 
The categorisation of countries is reflected in Table 3, with numbers in brackets 
indicating the respective reform phase.  
                                           
6  Ireland, for example, reduced primary spending by over 12% of GDP in the first phase and 
again by 6% in the second phase. The UK shows even more peculiarities as it experienced 
two phases of expenditure reform which each time were followed by very strong expendi-
ture increases, so that the current ratio of public spending is not much different from 20 
years ago. 
7  For a more detailed discussion of New Zealand’s experience see Massey, 1995; Scott, 
1996 or Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000. 
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Table 3: Reform categories 
Categories Countries 
Ambitious and early reform-
ers 
Ireland (1), Luxembourg, the Netherlands (1), United 
Kingdom (1) 
Ambitious and late reformers Belgium (2), Canada, Finland, Ireland (2), the Netherlands (2), Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom (2) 
Timid reformers Austria, Belgium (2), Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, United States 
Other countries Australia, Greece, Portugal 
 
The following section will discuss individually the experiences of countries that 
undertook ambitious reforms, according to our categorisation. While there are 
12 cases affecting 9 countries, we will not discuss Luxembourg due to limited 
data availability. We will look at the expenditure reforms undertaken, the ac-
companying institutional reforms and at complementary structural reforms that 
may have affected the fiscal or economic performance of the country in ques-
tion. In the subsequent section, we propose a number of horizontal conclusions 
from the case studies in both quantitative and qualitative terms.  
3 Country case studies of expenditure reform experiences 
The different experiences with expenditure reforms that OECD countries have 
made over the last decades are highly instructive from a case by case perspec-
tive. Discussing and comparing individual experiences is insightful in several 
respects: On the one hand, each expenditure reform is unique. The economic and 
political conditions from which it arises as well as its effects differ from country 
to country and over time. Hence, we naturally observe a range of idiosyncratic 
features associated with each single expenditure reform. On the other hand, 
some common characteristics stand out, too. Therefore, the following country 
studies should be of relevance beyond the specific cases at hand. With the ex-
ception of Luxembourg, we discuss all countries that qualify as ‘ambitious re-
formers’. All country analyses benefited from the respective OECD country sur-
veys; further sources are quoted where appropriate. The case studies are pre-
sented in the order of ambition, i.e. listed by the degree of the primary expendi-
ture adjustment, starting with one of the most impressive expenditure reform 
success stories in economic history: Ireland.  
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3.1 Ireland 
Ireland: The macro picture (% of GDP)
Phase 1 Phase 2
T0 T0-T2 T0-T7 T0_2 T0-T2 T0-T7
1982 1982-1984 1982-1989 1992 1992-1994 1992-1999
Total revenue 41.9 2.5 -1.6 42.4 0.0 -5.4
Total expenditure 56.2 -1.6 -13.3 45.3 -1.0 -10.9
Primary expenditure 47.5 -2.1 -12.4 38.2 0.1 -6.2
Fiscal balance -15.2 4.4 12.5 -3.0 1.0 5.5
Cyclically adj. balance -15.2 5.7 11.9 -2.0 3.2 2.6
Cyclically adjusted primary balance -5.3 6.1 9.8 5.1 2.2 -2.1
Public debt 84.6 14.1 15.7 92.5 -2.9 -43.8
Real GDP growth (%) 2.3 2.1 3.9 3.3 2.4 7.4
Trend GDP growth (%) 3.3 -0.3 0.6 5.6 0.8 2.7
Inflation (CPI growth in %) 17.2 -8.6 -13.2 3.1 -0.8 -1.5
Employment ratio 57.8 -3.4 -5.0 53.0 1.0 11.8
Source: Ameco, OECD 
Ireland: The disaggregated picture (% of GDP)
Phase 1 Phase 2
T0 T0-T2 T0-T7 T0_2 T0-T2 T0-T7
1982 1982-1984 1982-1989 1992 1992-1994 1992-1999
Total expenditure 56.2 -1.6 -13.3 45.3 -1.0 -10.9
Interest 8.8 0.4 -1.0 7.1 -1.0 -4.8
Primary expenditure 47.5 -2.1 -12.4 38.2 0.1 -6.2
Government consumption 20.4 -1.1 -5.2 17.9 -0.4 -3.9
Thereof: compensation of employees 12.1 -0.4 -2.3 11.2 -0.3 -3.0
Transfers and subsidies 15.7 1.1 -2.2 14.1 -0.4 -4.7
Transfers 14.4 0.5 -2.1 12.9 -0.4 -4.4
Subsidies 1.3 0.7 -0.1 1.2 -0.1 -0.3
Investment 5.0 -1.2 -3.2 2.1 0.2 1.0
Functional:
Education 5.8 -0.3 -0.9 5.22 0.2 -0.9
Health 6.3 -0.4 -1.7 5.04 0.0 -0.5
Pensions 4.9 -0.1 -0.7 4.32 -0.2 -1.6
Memorandum item:
Government employment (change in %) 5.2 -3.8 -13.6 2.6 -0.3 8.7
Source: Ameco, OECD, Worldbank  
Ireland undertook major expenditure reforms over two periods (Phase 1 and 2, 
see, for example, Barry 1999). The first reform phase was initiated in the early 
1980’s after Ireland had been suffering from persistently low GDP growth, ac-
companied by rising unemployment rates and widening fiscal deficits. This 
situation had been aggravated by high inflation and large increases in the public 
debt ratio. In 1982, CPI Inflation had accelerated to 17%, public spending 
reached 56% of GDP, the deficit exceeded 15% of GDP and the public debt-to-
GDP ratio had increased to nearly 85%, rising above 100% in the mid-1980s. 
The second reform phase started in a less dramatic environment in 1994, but 
nevertheless some fiscal imbalances had reappeared and a relatively high debt 
ratio had remained at a time when Ireland was preparing for Monetary Union. 
The correction of Ireland’s fiscal situation started in 1982-84 with a mixed 
strategy that consisted of both expenditure-based and revenue-based adjustment. 
While this policy contributed to a significant improvement in the cyclically ad-
justed primary balance (by 6% of GDP within two years), the deficit still stood 
near 10% of GDP and the debt level continued rising up to 113% of GDP in 
1986. A genuine turnaround was undertaken when the adjustment effort was re-
inforced as of 1987. The so-called ‘Programme for National Recovery’ rested 
essentially on a deep-rooted expenditure reform. Almost the entire fiscal ad-
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justment during Phase 1 was placed on the spending side, with primary expendi-
ture falling by 12% of GDP over the seven-year period after 1982. In the second 
phase, public spending fell again by over 10% of GDP. For the total period since 
1982, spending even came down by over 20% of GDP to around 35% of GDP in 
recent years. Together with the recovery of economic growth, this unprece-
dented consolidation program yielded fiscal surpluses and allowed for a rapid 
decline of public debt and significant tax cuts. 
The substantial retrenchment of the first reform phase in the 1980s was 
mainly based on cuts in public consumption and investment. The public wage 
bill was brought down by continued restraint on wages and, more importantly, a 
significant reduction of civil service personnel. Public employment declined by 
almost 14% between 1982 and 1989, partially thanks to a hiring freeze. In addi-
tion, the expenditure reform involved legislative changes that lastingly embed-
ded significant cuts in the areas of transfers and subsidies. Subsidies were cut by 
almost two thirds in 1988 from a level of 3% of GDP in the preceding year. Fur-
thermore, social spending and specifically health and pension expenditure was 
reduced to a considerable extent. Eligibility for social security benefits was 
tightened and targeting was improved, while the real value of benefits was fro-
zen. User fees for universities and hospitals were established. Finally, the 
amount of borrowing by public enterprises was largely trimmed, including by 
abrogating major projects in the energy and telecommunications sector. Expen-
diture reform hence played a major role in improving macroeconomic conditions 
in the late 1980s.  
The second reform phase, starting in 1994, saw a resumption of expenditure-
based public finance consolidation (to counter renewed expenditure pressures) 
and concurred with steady and even stronger growth (Boyle and O’Leary 1997). 
The deficit disappeared in 1996 after the non-recurrence of special spending re-
quirements in 1995, and the continuously declining debt level was brought be-
low 40% of GDP in the year 2000, which resulted in significant interest savings. 
Tight controls on discretionary spending and declining interest rates helped to 
lower the headline deficit further. The primary expenditure-to-GDP ratio de-
clined by 6%. As in the previous reform phase, the bulk of the reduction in pri-
mary spending was achieved by lower spending on public employment and sig-
nificant declines in the area of transfers. Continued savings resulted from a low 
intake of public recruitment as well as from falling real levels of social transfers 
as the number of recipients was coming down in the wake of strong output and 
private employment growth. However, towards the end of phase 2, expenditure 
growth started to accelerate again, so that the expenditure ratio stopped falling 
despite strong growth. 
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From an institutional perspective, a radical strengthening of the position of the 
Minister of Finance can be seen as the essential political precondition for the 
implementation of the first phase of the Irish expenditure reform. Political own-
ership over Phase 1 of the reform was almost completely entrusted to the Fi-
nance Minister, who, from 1987 to 1989, possessed virtually unconditional Par-
liamentary support and the full backing of the Prime Minister to impose auster-
ity measures (Hallerberg, 2004). For the second adjustment phase, during the 
mid-1990s, the institutional underpinning of the expenditure reform is shaped by 
the conclusion of fiscal contracts among the governing coalitions, and the intro-
duction of multi-year budgeting. 
Complementary measures to the expenditure reform included public sector 
wage moderation in agreement with the trade unions as well as the transforma-
tion of centralised wage bargaining, leading to wage moderation also in the pri-
vate sector. Furthermore, the government reformed the tax system. The intro-
duction of the by far lowest corporate tax scheme in the EU at the time raised 
Ireland’s attractiveness for foreign direct investment. The normal VAT rate was 
reduced. Since 1987, the government pursued its tax policy specifically with a 
view to improving labour market incentives. Corresponding measures included 
successive reductions in the standard income tax rate from 35% to 26% and a 
cut in the top rate from 58% to 48% until the mid-1990s. Additionally, the stan-
dard tax bracket was doubled and the tax wedge narrowed from an average of 
43% of total employer labour cost in 1987 to 35% ten years later. Further size-
able tax reductions were implemented in 1996 and 1997. A three-year central 
wage agreement was announced in December 1996 which, in combination with 
the effects of the tax reform, contributed to continued wage moderation and in-
creased labour market flexibility. In addition, the government focussed on im-
proving work incentives. To this end, it reformed the benefit system and re-
aligned public employment programmes and services as well as vocational train-
ing and education. Moreover, privatisation of public companies as well as in-
creased public-private cooperation were continued, particularly in the areas of 
telecommunications and public banking. 
In terms of macroeconomic measures, the external sector was supported by a 
devaluation of the Irish pound in 1987, which also helped to reduce the costs for 
foreign investors and improved Irish competitiveness (Bartolini 1993). In the 
early 1990s, Ireland’s devaluation again supported the external sector. But the 
broader economic reforms that helped break the expectation of repeated cycles 
of devaluation, wage and fiscal pressures and inflation caused the impact to be 
more lasting in an environment of continued price stability.  
In summary, Ireland seems to be a case of a major change in the economic pol-
icy regime where expectations and behaviour of economic agents changed fun-
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damentally and for which expenditure reform constituted a key element. Subse-
quently, Ireland experienced swift employment creation, rising income, low 
spending ratios and public debt and, ultimately, convergence of living standards 
with those of the most advanced Western economies (Fitz Gerald 1999). In par-
ticular, the first phase of the Irish expenditure reform delivers a prime example 
of how expenditure retrenchment as part of a broad and deep structural and mac-
roeconomic reform agenda can  coincide with a swift and sustained economic 
recovery.8 Unsurprisingly, the Irish experience sparked the scientific debate on 
possible expansionary effects of fiscal contractions (starting with Giavazzi and 
Pagano, 1990). 
3.2 Sweden 
Sweden: The macro picture (% of GDP)
T0 T0-T2 T0-T7
1993 1993-1995 1993-2000
Total revenue 61.6 -0.9 0.8
Total expenditure 73.0 -5.2 -15.7
Primary expenditure 67.2 -6.1 -14.0
Fiscal balance -11.4 4.4 16.5
Cyclically adj. balance -7.3 1.6 11.0
Cyclically adjusted primary balance -1.4 2.5 9.2
Public debt 71.3 2.4 -18.4
Real GDP growth (%) -2.0 6.0 6.3
Trend GDP growth (%) 0.8 1.4 2.0
Inflation (CPI growth in %) 4.7 -2.3 -3.8
Employment ratio 73.2 -0.3 1.4
Source: Ameco, OECD  
Sweden: The disaggregated picture (% of GDP)
T0 T0-T2 T0-T7
1993 1993-1995 1993-2000
Total expenditure 73.0 -5.2 -15.7
Interest 5.8 0.9 -1.8
Primary expenditure 67.2 -6.1 -14.0
Government consumption 29.4 -2.2 -2.8
Thereof: Compensation of employees 18.6 -1.8 -2.8
Transfers and subsidies 27.1 -2.8 -8.0
Transfers 22.6 -2.0 -5.1
Subsidies 4.5 -0.8 -2.9
Investment 3.8 0.2 -0.9
Functional:
Education 7.6 -0.1 0.2
Health 7.5 -0.4 -0.4
Pensions 10.9 -1.0 -1.7
Memorandum item:
Government employment (change in %) 1.9 -3.5 -7.7
Source: Ameco, OECD, Worldbank  
Sweden’s experience with expenditure reform arose from a severe recession 
coupled with a financial crisis following the bubble-economy of the late 1980s 
(for an overview of Swedish reforms, see Henriksson 2003). This led to a sig-
nificant decline in the employment ratio, fiscal imbalances and strong inflation-
ary pressures. The public expenditure ratio had increased to a staggering 73% of 
GDP in 1993 while deficits exceeded 10% of GDP and public debt had risen 
rapidly to over 70% of GDP. 
Fiscal reforms started in earnest after 1993 when the government passed three 
successive ‘consolidation packages’. The strategy proved successful due to dis-
cretionary measures that combined revenue-enhancing tax increases with sub-
stantial reductions of public expenditure by almost 16 percentage points in the 
course of seven years. As fiscal balances improved and turned into surpluses, 
public debt also started coming down rapidly. 
                                           
8  On the basis of modelling causal factors behind Irish growth, it has been argued that the 
‘fiscal adjustment was directly responsible for a sizeable increase in the growth rate after 
the mid-1980s’ (see also Barry, 1991, de la Fuente and Vives 1997, Honohan, 1999). 
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The main expenditure categories being reduced were transfers and subsidies 
(down from 27% of GDP in 1993 to 19% in 2000; particularly in the areas of 
pensions and social security), government consumption (particularly in the area 
of public employment) and pensions. The fiscal consolidation course improved 
the structural primary balance by 2.5% of GDP within two years and by around 
9% of GDP within 7 years. State transfers to municipalities were frozen at the 
nominal 1994 level until 2000 in conjunction with banning local government 
borrowing. Considerable cuts, often on the basis of permanent legal changes, 
were imposed on transfers in the social security domain, including reductions in 
child allowances and compensations in family insurance, as well as in the area 
of pensions and sick payments. A subsequent ‘package’ contained further reduc-
tions in unemployment, sickness and parental benefits. Eligibility for benefits 
was tightened and replacement rates significantly reduced.  
Institutionally, the Swedish government improved legislative control over the 
budget process in the course of constitutional changes advocated by a special 
commission on the reform of the country’s fiscal institutions (for an overview of 
the institutional reforms in Sweden, see Frank 2004). The changes lengthened 
the Parliamentary period and imposed binding three-year expenditure ceilings 
on particular spending categories within an overall envelope on total expendi-
ture. Additionally, both the standing of the Minister of Finance in the cabinet 
and the position of the minority government vis-à-vis Parliament were strength-
ened, allowing to discontinue the spending-prone tradition of budgetary agree-
ments with the opposition. Following the institutional reform, budgetary control 
was shared by the government and the budgetary committee in Parliament and 
enhanced sufficiently. The reform, which is considered as considerably improv-
ing the political economy features of the Swedish system (Perotti 1998), also 
introduced a number of innovative features, such as provisions to ‘carry over’ a 
certain proportion of the budget earmarked for mandatory spending categories, 
thereby reducing the incentive to exhaust the annual expenditure frame. This 
also allows to finance higher-than-expected mandatory spending, e.g. on social 
benefits, from the ‘own’ funds of the respective spending category, rather than 
driving up the overall level of public expenditure. The Swedish government 
placed the budgetary retrenchment on a solid legal foundation and additionally 
used the EU’s surveillance process as a secondary basis for further strengthening 
its commitment to fiscal discipline. For example, the 1995 Convergence Pro-
gramme entailed a commitment to eliminate the budget deficit by 1998. Once 
this objective was achieved, expenditure rules supplemented by a 2%-of-GDP 
surplus rule helped to maintain fiscal discipline. 
Complementary measures flanking the expenditure reform include a floating 
exchange rate regime and a significant depreciation of the krona followed by 
monetary stabilisation by the (newly independent) central bank. Since mid-1995, 
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the government gradually implemented a pension reform and introduced a 
funded pillar. Besides these measures, the government pursued a privatization 
programme and higher degree of labour market liberalisation. The Swedish gov-
ernment did not resort to substantial tax cuts but tax restructuring reduced mar-
ginal income tax rates from up to 90% to at most 60-70%. This together with 
benefit reforms reduced tax evasion and benefit fraud, distortions and moral 
hazard (Lindbeck, 1997). 
All in all, Sweden is another example of a successful expenditure-based fiscal 
consolidation. This and institutional, macroeconomic and structural policy re-
forms as part of a rapid and comprehensive program were also accompanied by 
a strong and remarkably fast rebound in real and trend economic growth.9 
3.3 Canada 
Canada: The macro picture (% of GDP)
T0 T0-T2 T0-T7
1992 1992-1994 1992-1999
Total revenue 45.1 -1.2 -0.3
Total expenditure 52.6 -3.5 -11.4
Primary expenditure 44.9 -3.4 -9.5
Fiscal balance -9.3 2.5 10.9
Cyclically adj. balance n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cyclically adjusted primary balance n.a. n.a. n.a.
Public debt 110.5 8.6 0.3
Real GDP growth (%) 0.9 3.9 4.7
Trend GDP growth (%) 1.8 0.6 1.8
Inflation (CPI growth in %) 1.5 -1.3 0.2
Employment ratio 68.1 0.6 3.6
Source: Ameco, OECD  
Canada: The disaggregated picture (% of GDP)
T0 T0-T2 T0-T7
1992 1992-1994 1992-1999
Total expenditure 52.6 -3.5 -11.4
Interest 9.5 -0.3 -1.7
Primary expenditure 44.9 -3.4 -9.5
Government consumption 24.4 -1.9 -5.3
Thereof: Compensation of employees 15.4 -1.2 -3.9
Transfers and subsidies 15.3 -1.0 -3.3
Transfers 13.5 -0.5 -2.5
Subsidies 1.8 -0.5 -0.8
Investment 2.9 0.0 -0.5
Functional:
Education 7.3 -0.7 -1.9
Health 7.3 -0.6 -1.1
Pensions 4.9 0.0 -0.2
Memorandum item:
Government employment (change in %) 1.0 -0.1 0.2
Source: Ameco, OECD, Worldbank  
The Canadian economy entered a severe downturn in 1990. The recession was 
followed by a historically slow recovery and, consequently, unemployment rates 
increased significantly, peaking at 11.5 per cent in 1992. In the same year, pub-
lic spending rose well above 50% of GDP, fiscal deficits reached 9% of GDP 
and, as a result, the public debt-to-GDP ratio grew sharply to well above 100% 
of GDP. The worsening of the overall general government deficit was, to a large 
extent, caused by an increasingly difficult provincial budget situation. Moreover, 
Canada was facing substantial competitive disadvantages due to high labour 
costs, low productivity growth rates and a pronounced exchange-rate apprecia-
tion since the mid-1980’s. 
In this situation, the federal government started an ambitious program of fiscal 
tightening as of 1993, which, unlike previous attempts at fiscal adjustment, was 
                                           
9  Sweden has also been identified as among the prime examples of possible non-Keynesian 
effects of fiscal adjustments (Giavazzi and Pagano 1995). 
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to be chiefly expenditure-based (Kneebone and McKenzie 1999). Within two 
years, total and primary expenditure declined by around 3.5% of GDP. The con-
solidation course was continued in the following years such that total spending 
fell by more than 11% of GDP over seven years in comparison to the peak level 
in 1992. The budget was balanced in 1997, and in 1999 the fiscal deficit had 
been improved by more than 10% of GDP compared to 1992. Successful fiscal 
consolidation went hand in hand with a strong increase in trend growth and also 
started to bring down the public debt ratio. 
As regards reform measures, structural cuts in government consumption (es-
pecially compensation of public employees) accounted for almost half of the 
overall retrenchment, while about one third was achieved by reducing transfers 
to households and subsidies. Amendments to and ultimately the discontinuation 
of the unemployment insurance systems led to reduced spending on income 
support by adjusting eligibility requirements and cutting the replacement rate. 
Reforms also took place in the system of transfers to the provinces. These trans-
fers were reduced in order to improve provincial cost efficiency and control fed-
eral spending. Moreover, in 1996/1997 several provincial social assistance pro-
grammes were merged into one comprehensive scheme and moved from a cost-
sharing approach to a system of block grants, further limiting social expenditure. 
Important improvements were also achieved in the field of privatisation and 
public sector reform. A so called ‘Programme Review’ was introduced in 1994 
in order to enhance public sector efficiency and to reduce the overall cost of 
government. This led to the (partly) privatisation of a number of major state-
owned enterprises.  
Expenditure-based fiscal consolidation in Canada was enabled by important in-
stitutional changes under the specificities of a federal system (Boadway and 
Hobson 1993). The ‘Expenditure Control Act’ of 1990 had already imposed 
limitations on spending growth for most expenditure categories. Subsequently, 
the so-called ‘Spending Control Act’ was implemented in 1992 in order to keep 
primary spending on public programme below 1991 levels for the subsequent 
five years. Once surpluses were achieved as of 1997, the government success-
fully resisted them being spent. Both at the federal as well as at the provincial 
levels, “contingency reserves” aimed to use budgetary surpluses for public debt 
reduction (Kennedy, Robbins and Delorme, 2001).  
The success of Canada’s fiscal consolidation in the 1990’s was also based on a 
wide range of complementary reforms. The reform of transfer systems and 
more extensive use of privatizations not only benefited the budget but also im-
proved conditions and incentives on the supply side. The reform of the unem-
ployment insurance system was coupled with active labour market policies. Ad-
ditionally, a number of measures were introduced to increase labour market 
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flexibility and the skill level of the work force. Moreover, the government un-
dertook a major restructuring of financial legislation, increasing competition, 
innovation and efficiency in the financial sector. In the area of taxation, reforms 
lowered the tax burden while improving the fairness of the tax system, broaden-
ing the tax base and, at the provincial level, reducing personal income taxes.  
All in all, Canada’s fiscal consolidation period in the 1990’s can be described as 
a success story, built on a three-pillar strategy: low and stable inflation, struc-
tural reforms and substantial expenditure reductions. Within a seven year period 
following the spending peak in 1992, Canada was able to substantially improve 
the soundness of its public finances. Trend growth as well as employment 
picked up significantly and notably early-on in the course of the process. Strong 
institutional underpinnings also helped to sustain fiscal soundness once deficits 
had disappeared. 
3.4 Finland 
Finland: The macro picture (% of GDP)
T0 T0-T2 T0-T7
1993 1993-1995 1993-2000
Total revenue 57.4 -1.7 -1.3
Total expenditure 64.8 -5.1 -15.7
Primary expenditure 60.3 -4.6 -14.0
Fiscal balance -7.3 3.4 14.4
Cyclically adj. balance -1.8 0.4 6.7
Cyclically adjusted primary balance 2.7 -0.1 5.0
Public debt 56.4 0.7 -11.8
Real GDP growth (%) -1.2 4.7 6.2
Trend GDP growth (%) 0.2 1.6 3.4
Inflation (CPI growth in %) 2.2 -1.4 0.9
Employment ratio 60.2 0.1 6.2
Source: Ameco, OECD  
Finland: The disaggregated picture (% of GDP)
T0 T0-T2 T0-T7
1993 1993-1995 1993-2000
Total expenditure 64.8 -5.1 -15.7
Interest 4.5 -0.5 -1.6
Primary expenditure 60.3 -4.6 -14.0
Government consumption 24.5 -1.5 -3.8
Thereof: Compensation of employees 16.8 -1.6 -3.6
Transfers and subsidies 27.4 -2.5 -9.4
Transfers 24.1 -2.0 -7.7
Subsidies 3.3 -0.5 -1.8
Investment 2.9 -0.2 -0.3
Functional:
Education 7.8 -0.7 -1.8
Health 6.3 -0.7 -1.3
Pensions 9.1 -0.5 -1.5
Memorandum item:
Government employment (change in %) -4.9 0.6 5.7
Source: Ameco, OECD, Worldbank
Finland started its reforms in a very difficult economic and fiscal environment. 
Following the end of the late 1980s bubble-economy and the disruption of trade 
with the Soviet Union, the country experienced a severe economic slump, which 
lasted from 1990 to mid-1993. GDP fell by almost 15% and unemployment rose 
to 19%. On the back of rising welfare spending and falling revenue, the spend-
ing ratio had reached nearly 65% of GDP and the deficit exceeded 7% while 
bailout costs for the banking sector further accelerated the increase in the public 
debt ratio.  
In these circumstances, Finland undertook an ambitious expenditure reform 
program (for an overview, see Hetemäki 2003). Primary spending growth of 
the central government was brought under control and was reduced succes-
sively. This resulted in a restrictive fiscal stance after 1994 when the measures 
started to bite fully. Total expenditure was reduced by 5% of GDP in the course 
of 2 years and by 15% of GDP to 49% of GDP over seven years. In the same 
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time span, the fiscal balance improved by 14% of GDP to a surplus of 7% (in-
cluding extraordinary revenue of 2% of GDP in that year). With fiscal consoli-
dation and reviving growth, public debt also started declining rapidly towards 
the end of the 1990s. 
Individual measures of the Finnish expenditure retrenchment were mainly 
based on lasting cuts of subsidies and transfers to households as well as gov-
ernment consumption. These declined by 3% and 1½% of GDP respectively in 
the first two years and continued declining strongly thereafter. The cuts were 
mainly orchestrated through a sustained compression of central government ex-
penditure, which declined even in absolute terms from 1995 onwards. Around 
one third of these expenditure cuts took the form of reductions in central gov-
ernment transfers to municipalities, including on education, health care and pub-
lic pensions. Major savings were achieved through moderate wage agreements 
in the public sector and reductions in public employment (by almost 5% alone in 
1993). Interest payments levelled off in the context of declining interest rates 
and falling public debt. 
Changes in fiscal institutions were crucial to the attainment of expenditure cuts 
(Corsetti and Roubini 1996). A legal change in 1992 reduced the parliamentary 
requirement for spending reductions to simple majority rule instead of the previ-
ously required two thirds majority. By consequence, it became immediately and 
substantially more difficult to form blocking minorities against measures of ex-
penditure restraint. Hitherto, the previous arrangement had rendered expenditure 
cuts near to impossible (Meklin et al 2004). In 1993, Finland additionally re-
formed the funding of municipalities, replacing retrospective reimbursements 
with prospective block grants. In 1995, two further institutional elements 
strengthened the consolidation course: Firstly, a coalition agreement after the 
1995 elections contained strong commitments to continue expenditure restraint, 
and secondly, Finland’s entry into the EU and the process of Maastricht conver-
gence added an external framework to the restitution of fiscal soundness. Fi-
nally, the success of consolidation was facilitated with the introduction of effec-
tive expenditure ceilings, implementing reductions of central government spend-
ing levels in the areas of subsidies, transfers and public employment over a 
three-year horizon.  
There were also significant complementary reform measures. An initial ex-
change rate devaluation benefited the tradable sector. Tripartite biannual ‘in-
comes policy agreements’ in the national tradition of centralised wage bargain-
ing ensured wage moderation and contributed to low levels of inflation (and a 
break with past trends of inflation eroding the gains of devaluations rapidly). 
Monetary policy encouraged moderate wage and price behaviour through the 
announcement of a 2% target for underlying inflation. Furthermore, the govern-
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ment implemented a series of changes to the taxation system. Their overall im-
pact was subservient to the overarching goal of regaining fiscal soundness and 
improved the revenue base, for example allowing for surpluses at the municipal 
level and in the social security funds. The measures included lower taxation of 
income, a VAT reform and an increase in social security contributions. Finally, 
the Finnish authorities also restructured the banking industry, followed by la-
bour market and pension reforms in conjunction with major privatisations and 
deregulations of formerly public enterprises (e.g. telecommunication). 
In summary, in the wake of expenditure cuts that were part of a comprehensive 
institutional, macroeconomic and structural reform program, growth and em-
ployment picked up strongly and already within two years after the reforms were 
started. Consolidation and reform   concurred with strengthening confidence and 
higher growth which, in turn, facilitated further consolidation. 
3.5 Belgium 
Belgium: The macro picture (% of GDP)
T0 T0-T2 T0-T7
1983 1983-1985 1983-1990
Total revenue 49.0 0.7 -2.2
Total expenditure 63.8 -3.9 -10.2
Primary expenditure 53.9 -4.7 -12.3
Fiscal balance -14.8 4.5 8.0
Cyclically adj. balance -12.3 4.0 4.4
Cyclically adjusted primary balance -2.5 4.8 6.4
Public debt 109.4 9.0 19.8
Real GDP growth (%) 0.3 1.3 2.8
Trend GDP growth (%) 1.8 -0.2 0.7
Inflation (CPI growth in %) 7.7 -2.8 -4.2
Employment ratio 55.4 -0.3 2.9
Source: Ameco, OECD  
Belgium: The disaggregated picture (% of GDP)
T0 T0-T2 T0-T7
1983 1983-1985 1983-1990
Total expenditure 63.8 -3.9 -10.2
Interest 9.9 0.8 2.1
Primary expenditure 53.9 -4.7 -12.3
Government consumption 23.5 -0.1 -3.0
Thereof: compensation of employees 13.2 -0.5 -2.0
Transfers and subsidies 22.2 -1.4 -4.2
Transfers 19.4 -1.1 -3.2
Subsidies 2.8 -0.3 -1.1
Investment 3.9 -0.9 -2.2
Functional:
Education 6.0 -0.2 -1.1
Health 6.0 -0.1 0.6
Pensions 6.7 -0.1 0.9
Memorandum item:
Government employment (change in %) -1.4 0.8 2.4
Source: Ameco, OECD, Worldbank  
Following the second oil crisis of the late 1970s, the Belgian economy deterio-
rated markedly. By 1983, public spending stood at 63.8% of GDP, the deficit 
was approaching 15% of GDP while the debt level exceeded 100% of GDP. The 
unemployment rate was one of the highest across the OECD at 14.5% in 1983 
while growth had come to a standstill. Belgium seemed trapped in a ‘vicious 
circle’ with low competitiveness, rising unemployment and widening public sec-
tor deficits mutually reinforcing each other.  
In 1982, the government entered a first period of fiscal consolidation (Phase 1) 
and announced a ‘recovery plan’. This was followed in 1984 by two successive 
biannual ‘Corrective Public Finance Plans’, lasting until 1988. Whereas the first 
Corrective Public Finance Plan also included measures to increase government 
revenue (through higher labour taxes and social security contributions), the sec-
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ond programme exclusively focused on expenditure-based consolidation.10 A 
second (though more timid) wave of consolidation subsequently occurred until 
1997 in the context of Maastricht convergence (Phase 2, not included in the 
above table).  
During the first of two these reform phases, the fiscal stance was tightened sig-
nificantly as of 1983. Total public expenditure came down by 10% of GDP by 
1990 and this decline was entirely due to primary expenditure reductions. While 
the first consolidation phase eliminated the risk of imminent macroeconomic 
destabilisation, significant deficits remained and public debt was still on the rise. 
In the second, more timid, reform phase, fiscal balances were, therefore, elimi-
nated so that public debt was also brought on a clear downward path. Further 
primary expenditure reductions were more moderate and much of the consolida-
tion was brought about by the fall in interest payments due to declining interest 
rates (and to a lesser extent as a premium from bringing down the debt ratio). 
The two reform phases together brought down total spending by almost 14 per-
centage points to 50% of GDP.  
Most of the adjustment in primary spending came from cuts in transfers and 
subsidies as well as in government consumption. During the first, ambitious, 
consolidation phase, transfers were reduced through annual cuts from a peak at 
19.4% of GDP in 1983 to 16.2% in 1990. They rose back to over 17% in the re-
cession of the early 1990s and were reduced anew below 16% in 1999 during 
the second retrenchment period. A considerable redrafting of benefit systems 
enabled sustained spending reductions and improved the incentive effects of 
these schemes. Subsidies were reduced throughout and more than halved by 
constant annual reductions from the 1983 level of 2.8% of GDP down to below 
1.2% in 1997. Nearly constant public employment supported the adjustment of 
public wage expenditure. In the first consolidation period, the government re-
duced investment spending drastically, down from 3.9% of GDP in 1983 to 
1.7% in 1990 before keeping it broadly constant thereafter. In the second phase, 
expenditure control at the federal level and for social security further contributed 
to primary expenditure reduction, albeit at a more “timid” scale (Reynders 2002, 
de Callatay 2002). 
Institutional change occurred mainly during the second consolidation phase in 
the 1990s. The government as well as regional and local authorities concluded a 
‘fiscal contract’ in which they agreed to respect the budgetary targets set by the 
so-called Conseil supérieur des finances. 
                                           
10  For a detailed discussion of Belgian public finance developments in the 1980s, see De 
Ryck (1993) and Frank (1993). 
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Complementary measures to the expenditure reforms were taken on the supply 
side, such as partially suspending the national wage indexation scheme in 1982, 
which delivered a freeze on real wage developments. Labour market policy was 
restructured, including a more active labour market policy to complement the 
reform of benefit systems. Public debt was rescheduled in the 1980s in order to 
spread the burden of interest payments more evenly across time. In the second 
phase, the structural reform progress was very limited (de Callatay, 2002). 
All in all, Belgium undertook an impressive fiscal consolidation and reform 
programme over two phases in the 1980s and 1990s. This brought deficits under 
control and debt on a declining path while bringing the public spending ratio 
down significantly. Over time, this also coincided with a significant increase in 
trend growth and employment, although both the reforms and the country’s eco-
nomic recovery were perhaps somewhat less spectacular than in some of the 
other cases. 
3.6 Netherlands 
Netherlands: The macro picture (% of GDP)
Phase 1 Phase 2
T0 T0-T2 T0-T7 T0_2 T0-T2 T0-T7
1983 1983-1985 1983-1990 1993 1993-1995 1993-2000
Total revenue 52.9 -0.2 -4.8 51.8 -5.7 -5.5
Total expenditure 58.3 -2.1 -5.0 54.6 -4.5 -9.8
Primary expenditure 52.8 -2.7 -5.1 48.5 -4.1 -7.5
Fiscal balance -5.4 1.9 0.2 -2.8 -1.3 4.3
Cyclically adj. balance -1.9 0.2 -4.7 -1.0 -1.9 -0.2
Cyclically adjusted primary balance 3.6 0.8 -4.6 5.0 -2.2 -2.5
Public debt 59.8 8.8 15.1 77.2 -2.0 -22.8
Real GDP growth (%) 1.8 0.9 2.3 0.7 2.4 2.8
Trend GDP growth (%) 1.9 0.4 1.0 2.6 0.1 0.0
Inflation (CPI growth in %) 2.7 -0.5 -0.3 2.6 -0.7 -0.2
Employment ratio 54.6 2.1 10.3 66.0 1.4 9.0
Source: Ameco, OECD 
Netherlands: The disaggregated picture (% of GDP)
Phase 1 Phase 2
T0 T0-T2 T0-T7 T0_2 T0-T2 T0-T7
1983 1983-1985 1983-1985 1993 1993-1995 1993-2000
Total expenditure 58.3 -2.1 -5.0 54.6 -4.5 -9.8
Interest 5.5 0.6 0.2 6.1 -0.3 -2.3
Primary expenditure 52.8 -2.7 -5.1 48.5 -4.1 -7.5
Government consumption 24.8 -1.1 -2.0 24.0 -0.6 -1.9
Thereof: Compensation of employees 13.2 -1.1 -2.5 10.9 -0.4 -1.2
Transfers and subsidies 22.2 -1.7 -2.2 19.4 -3.4 -6.5
Transfers 20.1 -1.9 -2.3 17.4 -2.4 -5.9
Subsidies 2.1 0.3 0.1 2.1 -1.0 -0.6
Investment 3.2 -0.1 -0.2 2.9 0.0 0.1
Functional:
Education 6.9 -0.6 -1.1 5.17 -0.2 -0.4
Health 5.5 -0.3 -0.1 6.30 -0.3 -0.8
Pensions 7.4 -0.3 0.4 7.69 -0.7 -1.2
Memorandum item:
Government employment (change in %) 0.2 1.7 7.2 0.4 -2.6 1.8
Source: Ameco, OECD, Worldbank  
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The Dutch economy deteriorated markedly since the late 1970s in the wake of 
the second oil shock and plunged into the most severe recession of post-war 
times. By the early 1980s, the employment ratio had significantly fallen to be-
low 55%. Labour market slack was absorbed to some degree by social security 
schemes and public employment programmes, which, together with growing 
interest payments and subsidies, contributed to public expenditure rising above 
58% of GDP. In 1982, the fiscal deficit had reached more than 6% of GDP and 
interest payments already amounted to over 10% of tax revenues.  
Expenditure retrenchment was imposed as of 1983.11 In Phase 1, primary ex-
penditure came down by almost 3% of GDP within the first two years and by 
over 5% within 7 years (by 1990). However, initially this did not result in suffi-
cient deficit improvement as revenue was also falling strongly. During Phase 2 
in the 1990s, the retrenchment course was continued and deficits disappeared in 
the late 1990s. Public debt, which had continued to rise in the 1980s, started fal-
ling significantly during the second retrenchment phase. Total expenditure de-
clined from over 58% of GDP in 1983 to about 53% in 1990. In the second 
phase, it was reduced considerably further to less than 45% of GDP by 2000. 
As regards reform measures during Phase 1, the ratios of government con-
sumption, transfers and subsidy spending declined by roughly equal amounts. In 
the second phase, transfers came down very strongly. Investment was mostly 
spared over the entire time frame. Concrete measures included restraint on civil 
service salaries and new recruitment and lending and capital transfers to enter-
prises.  
The first consolidation package of 1982/83 encompassed nominal freezes on 
government pay, social benefits and volume ceilings on social security expendi-
ture as well as further cuts in non-wage expenditure of the government. Subse-
quently, income support schemes and benefits in the areas of unemployment, 
disability, sick leave and health services were reformed, for example, by reduc-
ing replacement rates and eligibility, especially for disability benefits (de Mooij, 
2003).  
In the second reform phase, lower social security outlays were the main contri-
bution to spending cuts (especially once the indexation of benefits was sus-
pended in 1992), while infrastructure investment was allowed to grow. Addi-
tionally, subsidies for housing and public transport were reduced. Sickness in-
surance was privatized and a major tightening combined with the introduction of 
competition occurred in the disability scheme (de Mooij, 2003). Defence expen-
                                           
11  For a review of Dutch expenditure developments from a historic perspective, see Bos and 
Timmerhuis (2006). 
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diture was also reduced markedly. Health care spending was even reduced over 
the combined 20-year period by improving demand, supply and insurance incen-
tives. 
From an institutional perspective, the budget process of the Netherlands has 
benefited from the introduction and periodic adaptation of fiscal rules and con-
tracts between governing coalition parties (van Dijkhuizen 2003, Hallerberg and 
von Hagen, 1999; Berndsen, 2001; Heeringa and Lindh, 2001). These included 
deficit reduction paths and expenditure ceilings in the first reform phase as well 
as rules for the distribution of expenditure savings and growth dividends be-
tween tax and deficit cuts for the second phase. The institutional improvements 
underpinned the permanent character of the reduction of public spending.12 Ad-
ditionally, Maastricht convergence also provided an external source of fiscal 
discipline to the government during the second reform phase. 
With regard to complementary measures, in 1982, the Wassenaar Agreement 
initiated a series of labour market reforms, which substantially improved the 
employment situation in the Netherlands. In the course of this agreement, social 
partners gave up wage indexation and repeatedly agreed on moderate wage 
claims. A new unemployment benefit system was introduced in 1987. Comple-
mentary measures also included a strategic reorientation of industry subsidies. 
Tax policy included tax cuts with a shift from direct to indirect taxation. Struc-
tural reforms in the transfer system and minimum wage setting helped increase 
employment, especially of women (Bos and Timmerhuis, 2006). A Deutsche-
mark target for the exchange rate and the convergence process towards EMU 
membership helped to contain inflationary expectations and reinforced the ra-
tionale behind the fiscal reform efforts. 
During the second reform phase, the government implemented further tax cuts 
and reduced employers’ social contributions, especially for low wage groups, 
giving considerable support to job creation. The budgetary efforts to curb social 
security spending went hand in hand with the decentralisation, tightening and 
the injection of market forces into the social security and employment systems, 
thereby not only reducing costs but also increasing efficiency and incentive ef-
fects. For example, the sick-leave payment insurance was privatized and em-
ployees can ‘opt-out’ of the disability insurance.  
In sum, the Netherlands represents yet another case of remarkable fiscal re-
trenchment as part of an ambitious and comprehensive reform package. When 
                                           
12 At the same time, electoral competition and the corresponding incentives to call for spend-
ing increases were eased by the party-political constellation and the fact that the likelihood 
for any one party to be part of the governing coalition was not directly related to its voting 
share but rather to good relations with the other parties (Seils 2004). 
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the first reform phase proved insufficient, a second round in the early 1990s 
achieved further improvements. In the wake of these reforms, the employment 
ratio and trend growth increased rapidly, which, in turn, facilitated continued 
expenditure restraint. 
3.7 Spain 
 
Spain: The macro picture (% of GDP)
T0 T0-T2 T0-T7
1993 1993-1995 1993-2000
Total revenue 40.9 -2.5 -2.4
Total expenditure 47.6 -2.6 -8.2
Primary expenditure 42.6 -2.8 -6.4
Fiscal balance -6.7 0.1 5.8
Cyclically adj. balance -5.7 0.5 3.4
Cyclically adjusted primary balance 0.0 1.0
Public debt 58.4 5.5 1.5
Real GDP growth (%) -1.0 3.8 6.1
Trend GDP growth (%) 2.4 0.3 1.1
Inflation (CPI growth in %) 4.6 0.1 -1.1
Employment ratio 50.4 0.4 9.3
Source: Ameco, OECD  
Spain: The disaggregated picture (% of GDP)
T0 T0-T2 T0-T7
1993 1993-1995 1993-2000
Total expenditure 47.6 -2.6 -8.2
Interest 5.0 0.2 -1.8
Primary expenditure 42.6 -2.8 -6.4
Government consumption 18.8 -0.8 -1.5
Thereof: Compensation of employees 11.8 -0.5 -1.4
Transfers 16.2 -2.3 -4.1
Investment 4.2 -0.5 -1.0
Functional:
Education 4.5 0.2 0.0
Health 5.8 -0.3 -0.4
Pensions 8.3 0.1 0.2
Memorandum item:
Government employment (change in %) -0.3 1.7 20.0
Source: Ameco, OECD, Worldbank  
The Spanish economy entered a slowdown in 1992 and went into recession the 
year after. The unemployment rate came close to 24% in 1993. Cyclical effects 
in conjunction with large overruns in all main spending categories led to the 
public expenditure ratio increasing to a peak of 47.6% of GDP. The significant 
fiscal slippages saw the deficit increasing to 6.7% of GDP and public debt rising 
to near 60% of GDP. 
Using the Maastricht convergence process as an external anchor, the govern-
ment embarked on a determined and expenditure-based consolidation course 
between 1994 and 1997 (for an overview of Spanish fiscal reforms, see also 
González-Páramo and Hernández de Cos, 2005). Total and primary expenditure 
declined by almost 3% of GDP in the first two years of adjustment and fell by 
over 8% and 6% respectively in seven years until the year 2000. While some of 
the expenditure savings were used for tax cuts, most went into the elimination of 
fiscal imbalances. With growth rebounding and the deficit disappearing towards 
the end of the 1990s, public debt also started coming down rapidly. 
Public expenditure measures followed very much the trend for ambitious ad-
justers. Almost half of the expenditure consolidation fell on cuts in transfers (4% 
of GDP) while government consumption and investment accounted for about 
one quarter and interest savings for the remaining expenditure decline. Individ-
ual expenditure measures of the highly restrictive 1994 and 1995 budget in-
cluded restraint on public sector wages, some reductions in public employment, 
cuts in spending on security and defence, a decline in capital transfers to public 
enterprises as well as in payments to regions and the abolishment of certain em-
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ployment and training schemes. Of significant importance were structural reduc-
tions in social transfers (especially in the areas of unemployment, pensions and 
disability benefits) in the context of a wider reform of benefit systems, which 
also aimed at reducing fraud and abuse. The coverage of the unemployment 
scheme was reduced from 83% of the registered unemployed to 69% thanks to 
tightened eligibility. Furthermore, the government attempted to limit health ex-
penditure, a traditional cause for budgetary overruns, and curbed the trend rise in 
pensions. In 1996 and 1997, discretionary expenditure was compressed further, 
particularly in the fields of government consumption, transfers to public enter-
prises and investment.13 Social security spending was reduced through more ef-
fectively fighting fraud and abuse. New techniques to finance infrastructure in-
vestment (such as Public Private Partnerships) allowed cushioning the reduc-
tions in public investment. Having achieved Maastricht convergence, however, 
discretionary spending adjustment came to a halt in 1998.  
From an institutional perspective, the consolidation effort was implemented 
through highly effective expenditure control mechanisms as of 1995 and through 
further strengthening the say of the already powerful Ministry of the Economy 
and Finance (Nieto 1996, Rato, 2004). Each ministerial department received 
monthly spending ceilings and the government could centrally distribute discre-
tionary spending cuts across the board whenever necessary. A further set of ex-
penditure control devices and stricter monitoring was introduced in 1997, plac-
ing further restraint on public crediting and curtailing the carrying forward of 
expenditures to future budgets. In addition, Spain introduced an internal Stabil-
ity Pact in order to contain the fiscal behaviour of regional governments, thereby 
improving the commitment quality of fiscal policy. Political coordination was 
improved within the ‘Fiscal and Financial Policy Council’, setting four-year 
deficit and debt targets for regional governments in conjunction with legal bor-
rowing constraints for regional and local administrations (Garcés Sanagustín 
2004).  
Complementary reform measures included a comprehensive labour market 
reform in 1994, which, together with tightened eligibility for social benefits, 
contributed to strong employment increases (see also Toharia and Malo 2000). 
Additionally, the government took first steps toward a pension reform. The tax 
code was reformed to enhance transparency and tax collection. Direct tax reform 
was financed via indirect tax increases and the dividend from expenditure re-
                                           
13  Cuts in subsidies and capital transfers to public enterprises were facilitated by restructuring 
the ownership of public enterprises to allow a more beneficial accounting treatment of the 
support of loss-making firms by profitable ones. 
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form.14 Public sector wage restraint was mirrored by moderate wage develop-
ments in the private sector. Finally, an ambitious privatisation programme and 
the liberalisation of financial markets improved the economic environment.  
On the macroeconomic side, exchange rate devaluations of 1992-93 coupled 
with fiscal reform and stability-oriented monetary policies helped create a re-
gime change away from earlier cycles of devaluation gains eroded by lax wage, 
monetary and fiscal policies. This helped the adaptation of wage setting and 
made resulting competitiveness gains more lasting. 
In sum, the Spanish experience of a determined expenditure reform, coupled 
with significant structural reforms, not only safeguarded the sustainability of 
Spain’s public finances (De Castro and Hérnandez de Cos 2002) but indeed laid 
the ground for a broad-based fiscal consolidation and coincided with a pro-
nounced economic recovery (De Castro 2003). This achievement was facilitated 
by institutional improvements as well as by constructively engaging in the 
Maastricht convergence process. A strong rebound in growth and employment 
occurred already in the early years of the expenditure reform. 
3.8 United Kingdom 
United Kingdom: The macro picture (% of GDP)
Phase 1 Phase 2
T0 T0-T2 T0-T7 T0_2 T0-T2 T0-T7
1981 1981-198 1981-1988 1992 1992-1994 1992-1999
Total revenue 46.3 -0.8 -5.6 40.1 -1.9 0.4
Total expenditure 50.7 -1.8 -10.5 46.5 -1.6 -7.1
Primary expenditure 45.4 -1.5 -8.2 44.3 -1.9 -7.2
Fiscal balance -4.4 1.0 4.8 -6.5 -0.3 7.5
Cyclically adj. balance -2.3 0.4 1.0 -4.7 -1.5 5.6
Cyclically adjusted primary balance 3.0 0.1 -1.3 -2.5 -1.2 5.7
Public debt 53.5 -0.9 -11.3 39.2 9.3 5.6
Real GDP growth (%) -1.4 5.0 6.4 0.3 4.1 2.8
Trend GDP growth (%) 1.4 0.8 1.4 2.0 0.4 0.9
Inflation (RPI growth in %) 11.9 -7.3 -7.0 3.7 -1.3 -2.2
Employment ratio 66.7 -2.4 3.3 68.3 -0.2 2.9
Source: Ameco, OECD, National statistics (UK) 
United Kingdom: The disaggregated picture (% of GDP)
Phase 1 Phase 2
T0 T0-T2 T0-T7 T0_2 T0-T2 T0-T7
1981 1981-1983 1981-1988 1992 1992-1994 1992-1999
Total expenditure 50.7 -1.8 -10.5 46.5 -1.6 -7.1
Interest 5.3 -0.3 -2.3 2.3 0.3 0.1
Primary expenditure 45.4 -1.5 -8.2 44.3 -1.9 -7.2
Government consumption 22.2 -0.3 -2.5 21.1 -1.2 -2.7
Thereof: Compensation of employees 13.4 -0.3 -1.6 12.3 -1.3 -2.4
Transfers and subsidies 15.4 0.3 -2.0 16.5 0.0 -2.6
Transfers 13.4 0.7 -0.9 15.6 0.0 -2.2
Subsidies 2.0 -0.5 -1.1 0.9 -0.1 -0.4
Investment 2.1 0.1 -0.3 2.4 -0.1 -1.1
Functional:
Education 5.5 -0.3 -0.8 5.26 0.0 -0.8
Health 5.2 0.0 -0.3 5.77 0.0 -0.1
Pensions 6.0 0.2 -0.5 8.25 -0.1 -0.4
Memorandum item:
Government employment (change in %) -2.7 -3.2 -12.1 -0.7 -7.0 -9.5
Source: Ameco, OECD, Worldbank  
                                           
14  See González-Páramo, De Castro and Hernández de Cos (2003) for an anlysis of the inter-
action between spending and revenue developments. 
  27  
In 1979, the United Kingdom found itself in the deepest recession of post-war 
times, following the second oil shock. Unemployment was rising sharply and 
inflation went up to levels of 20%. Disinflation became the top priority of the 
incoming Thatcher government. But with very high tax rates, rising public ex-
penditure considerable deficits, expenditure reductions moved increasingly to 
the fore after 1981 to support price stabilisation and a broader economic revival. 
After the bust of the early 1990s with record deficits, expenditure-based fiscal 
consolidation was again prioritised.  
Fiscal retrenchment in the UK was undertaken in two phases. Phase 1 started 
when public expenditure had reached a peak level of over 50% of GDP in 1981. 
In the following two years, public spending was cut by nearly 2% of GDP and 
by a total of 10.5% of GDP in the seven-year period until 1988 (in the latter 
years also helped by strong growth). The fiscal balance was turned from a deficit 
of over 4% of GDP into a small surplus. Half of the total spending reductions 
were used for consolidation and the other half for tax cuts. Public debt started 
declining in proportion to GDP as consolidation took hold. In the second phase, 
starting in 1993, total expenditure was reduced by over 7% of GDP in seven 
years. As interest payments had stabilised, the retrenchment during this period 
was entirely due to cuts in primary expenditure. Between the early 1980s and 
late 1990s, total spending declined by over 11% of GDP, half of which was, 
however, reversed in recent years.15 
During the first adjustment phase, a number of important reforms occurred in 
different categories of discretionary spending. Government consumption de-
clined markedly and lastingly when public employment was cut by more than 
12% between 1981 and 1988 and by 4.8% alone in 1985. Subsidies were re-
duced resolutely as of 1984, while transfers were brought down significantly 
after 1986. A large-scale privatization programme and the introduction of public 
private partnerships helped further reducing current expenditure and public debt 
while generating taxes from profits (rather than budget financed-losses) of the 
newly privatised enterprises.16 The second consolidation phase addressed the 
budgetary deterioration caused by another downturn in the early 1990s. The new 
spending peak was reached in 1992 and, subsequently, the three categories of 
government consumption, public employment and transfers were cut down in 
parallel by more than 2% of GDP until 1999. Individual measures included a 
freezing of government departments’ running costs and public sector wage bills 
                                           
15  Primary spending increased by over 5% of GDP between 1999 and 2004. The main reason 
for the now limited difference in spending between the UK and much of continental 
Europe lies in lower pension spending. 
16  See Bishop, Kay and Mayer (1994, 1995) and Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) for more dis-
cussion on the British reform experiences especially with privatisation. 
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at 1993 levels for three years, tighter eligibility criteria for social benefits as well 
as savings on defence, housing and transport programmes. Unlike in the first 
phase of expenditure reforms, the spending reductions in the 1990s did not 
sizeably come at the expense of public investment. 
As regards fiscal institutions, in both consolidation phases, the persistent re-
trenchment course was ultimately based on the political will of the government 
and the large degree of institutional control that the Chancellor wields over the 
budget, backed by the Prime Minister (Thain and Wright 1995). The significant 
fiscal tightening also followed major institutional improvements (Kell 2001). 
The government introduced a so-called ‘Medium Term Financial Strategy’ in 
1981 and committed to multi-annual monetary and budgetary targets with the 
aim to stabilise expectations. As budgetary targets were frequently not met, a 
more effective balanced budget rule was introduced in 1985. Following the 
ERM crisis, a so-called ‘New Control Total’ was introduced, which established 
a budgetary envelope and a more clear-cut system of top-down budgeting 
(Hallerberg 2004). After 1997, the labour government reformed the UK’s fiscal 
institutions (with a golden rule and stable net debt over the cycle being key ele-
ments of the new “code for fiscal stability”) (Kilpatrick, 2001; Kennedy et.al, 
2001). This initially helped implement fiscal consolidation and expenditure re-
straint. 
Policy measures complementary to the expenditure reform initially prioritized 
disinflation. Important tax reforms were undertaken in parallel to the first fiscal 
consolidation phase in the 1980s to reduce incentive distortions. The measures 
included a lowering of the corporate tax rate from 52% in 1979 to 35% by 1986 
and the basic and top rates of personal income tax from 33% and 83% to 25% 
and 40%, respectively, by 1989. A shift from direct to indirect taxes improved 
supply conditions and prevented the revenue base from eroding, which was also 
supported by the proceeds from North Sea oil. The combination of privatization 
with deregulation and liberalisation greatly enhanced the efficiency of formerly 
public enterprises as well as the economy as a whole. Both expenditure reform 
phases were accompanied by important changes to the labour market, turning 
the United Kingdom in one of the least regulated countries in the OECD, as well 
as wide-ranging improvements to educational and training institutions.  
In the second reform phase, the independence of the Bank of England in 1997 as 
well as continued tax reforms, especially in the area of corporate taxation and 
social contributions in the low-wage sector, were the most important comple-
mentary measures. Additionally, the government improved legislation on corpo-
rate governance and competition while continuing the course of regulatory re-
form in the utilities sector.  
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All in all, the United Kingdom undertook ambitious expenditure reforms in the 
1980s and 1990s which were embedded in one of the most far-reaching privati-
sation and structural reform programs of industrialised countries. This allowed 
the return to sound public finances and preceded a sustained revival of employ-
ment and economic growth, which commenced already at a relatively early stage 
of the reform process. 
4 Expenditure reforms in OECD countries – horizontal 
analysis 
The preceding section has analysed a number of ambitious expenditure reform 
episodes which have been undertaken in OECD countries within the last 25 
years. The purpose of this section is to identify common patterns and differences 
across the case studies and to compare these countries’ fiscal and growth per-
formance with that of countries that undertook more timid reforms.17  
4.1 Common patterns and differences across case studies 
When looking at expenditure reform efforts, it becomes apparent that all coun-
tries focused efforts strongly on government consumption (wages and employ-
ment) and transfers and subsidies. About 2/3 of the reduction in the total expen-
diture and over 80% of the cuts in the primary expenditure ratio occurred in 
these two categories. Table 5 illustrates that 9 out of 11 reform episodes reported 
a decline in public consumption by more than 2% of GDP and 8 out of 11 fea-
tured a fall in transfers and subsidies by over 3% of GDP. All reform episodes 
are marked by public wage restraint and tightened eligibility criteria as well as 
reduced benefits for social transfers (see Table 5 and the Annex Table 3). By 
contrast, only few episodes contained major declines in public education. We 
will come back to these findings below when comparing ambitious with timid 
reformers. 
From Table 5 it also becomes apparent that expenditure reform was always part 
of a broader reform agenda. In all but one episode, expenditure reform went 
hand in hand with a strengthening of fiscal institutions (for more details, see the 
Annex Table 3 and Joumard et al., 2004 or Brumby, 1999). Pervasive institu-
tional change points to the eminent role of political economy factors in deter-
mining both the feasibility and the success of expenditure reforms (see also 
Alesina and Ardagna 1998).  
                                           
17  A crude robustness check for the results presented below consists of excluding Ireland, 
which features by far the greatest increase in growth dynamics. Also without Ireland, the 
results are very similar; both in terms of the comparison between timid and ambitious re-
formers and between large and small countries. 
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A majority of episodes, mainly in the early 1980s, also featured complementary 
macroeconomic reforms towards the establishment of monetary and external 
stability. In some cases, exchange rate devaluation proved supportive of the re-
form strategy. All countries undertook structural reforms that aimed at improv-
ing labour market performance, be it through liberalisation, benefit reform or tax 
reform. Privatization and recourse to public-private partnerships also featured in 
a large majority of episodes. This may suggest powerful synergies from a de-
termined and comprehensive reform strategy, including a strong commitment to 
ambitious expenditure retrenchment. 
Table 5: Summary findings for ambitious reform episodes 
Expenditure reform Structural reform 
 Public 
consump-
tion 1/ 
Transfers 
& subsi-
dies 1/ 
Institu-
tional 
reform 
Other mac-
roeconomic 
reform 
Labour 
market 
incentives 
Taxa-
tion 
Privatisa-
tion 
Ireland 1 XX XX X X X X X 
Ireland 2 X XX X X X X X 
Sweden X XX X X X X X 
Canada XX XX X  X X X 
Finland XX XX X X X X X 
Belgium XX XX  X X   
Netherlands 1 X X X X X X  
Netherlands 2 ~ XX X  X X X 
Spain ~ XX X X X X X 
UK 1 X X X X X X X 
UK 2 X X X X X X  
All 9 11 10 9 11 10 8 
  1/ Decline in 7 years by: more than 1% of GDP: ~ 
    more than 2% of GDP: X 
    more than 3% of GDP: XX 
4.2 Comparing ambitious and timid reformers:                          
expenditure developments 
When comparing expenditure developments in the episodes of ambitious reform 
with those that featured more timid reforms, some interesting differences 
emerge. We focus on medium-term developments within a seven year window 
(T1-T7) and we also distinguish the early ambitious reform episodes from the 
later ones.18 Charts 1-4 in Box 1 illustrate the main findings by showing un-
weighted averages for the three groups.  
                                           
18  Note that Switzerland is excluded as the expenditure maximum is too recent to allow the 
case study approach. Moreover, the primary spending decline of 0.3% was only minimal. 
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The differences in expenditure reduction are very substantial between the two 
groups. Within seven years, ambitious reform countries reduced total expendi-
tures by around 10% of GDP (Chart 1). This is more than twice as much as the 
decline achieved by timid reformers.19 Late ambitious reformers brought average 
spending significantly below the average of timid reformers. But efforts also 
differed markedly in the beginning of reform phases (i.e. the first two years) 
when primary spending went down by 3% for the average of ambitious reform-
ers versus only 1% for timid reformers. 
 
     Source: Ameco 
 
There are also major differences as regards the composition of the expenditure 
decline, with ambitious reformers showing on the whole “higher quality” 
changes. Both timid as well as ambitious reform countries benefited from re-
duced interest payments. But for timid reformers, reductions in interest spending 
amounted to around 1/2 of the overall expenditure decline, whereas this share 
                                                                                                                                   
Also notice that, in order to include Japan in the analysis, we used forecasted data for T7 
(2005) in this case. Moreover, due to data shortcomings, Luxembourg is excluded from the 
horizontal analysis.  
19  Note that, in contrast to Table 1, we now take account of all reform periods. Therefore, the 
countries which are characterised by two reform phases are included twice. 
Box 1: Medium-term post reform developments 
Chart 1: Reform ambition and total expenditure
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Chart 2: Reform ambition and government consumption
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Chart 3: Refrom ambition and transfers and subsidies
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represented only about 10% for ambitious reformers. Most importantly, the two 
ambitious reform waves reduced government consumption as well as transfers 
and subsidies more decisively (see Charts 2–3). Within the seven year reform 
period, ambitious reform countries reduced government consumption by around 
3% of GDP (compared to hardly 1% for timid reformers). Spending on transfers 
and subsidies declined by 3% of GDP for early ambitious reformers and by 6% 
of GDP in the case of late ambitious reformers, whereas it staid broadly constant 
for timid reformers. Public investment was cut strongly by the group of early 
ambitious reformers but only moderately by the other two groups (Chart 4). 
Education spending was touched little in the reform process for all groups on 
average. 
4.3 Comparing ambitious and timid reformers:                           
fiscal performance 
Ambitious expenditure reform episodes have also affected more profoundly the 
soundness of public finances than timid ones (Chart 5). Within seven years, 
early and late ambitious reformers were able to improve their fiscal balance by 
6.4% and 9.3% of GDP respectively. Timid reformers, on the other hand, ac-
complished an improvement by 4.4 percentage points. Ambitious expenditure 
reforms also yielded significant scope for tax cuts: ambitious reformers reduced 
taxes significantly, by 2-3% of GDP within seven years, as compared to little 
more than ½ percent tax cuts by timid reformers (Table 4).  
Chart 5: Reform ambition and fiscal balance
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             Source: Ameco 
Concerning the sustainability of fiscal policies, it is also important to examine 
whether expenditure reforms (via consolidation) helped reduce public debt. The 
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findings require some explanation. Table 6 shows that, on average, early ambi-
tious reformers did not immediately succeed in reducing public debt levels. Ini-
tial deficits in some of the sample countries were so high that, despite significant 
spending and deficit reductions, debt dynamics failed to reverse.  
Table 6: Public debt and tax ratios, changes 
Percent of GDP         
Public debt 
TO (or 
nearest) 
T7 (or 
nearest) 
2004 (or 
nearest) TO-T7 TO-2004 
  ratio ratio Ratio change change 
  
(% of 
GDP) 
(% of 
GDP) (% of GDP) 
(% of 
GDP) (% of GDP) 
Ambitious reformers, early 63.8 70.9 45.4 7.1 -18.4 
Ambitious reformers, late 72.2 59.4 51.9 -12.8 -20.3 
Timid reformers 87.8 86.8 82.9 -1.0 -4.9 
           
Tax ratio      
  
TO (or 
nearest) 
T7 (or 
nearest) 
2004 (or 
nearest) TO-T7 TO-2004 
Ambitious reformers, early 47.7 44.9 43.2 -2.9 -4.5 
Ambitious reformers, late 48.5 46.5 45.1 -2.0 -3.4 
Timid reformers 46.1 45.5 44.7 -0.7 -1.4 
Source: Ameco and own calculations 
Therefore, most of these countries initiated a second reform phase, starting in 
the early to mid-1990s. For these “repeated” reform episodes and for “new” re-
forming countries, debt dynamics were brought on a strong downward trend dur-
ing the mid- to late-1990s. Debt fell on average by almost 13% within 7 years. 
For all ambitious reformers, debt was 20% of GDP lower in 2004 than before 
the start of reform. By contrast, timid reformers, on average, did not experience 
noteworthy declines in their public debt ratios at all. 
4.4 Comparing ambitious and timid reformers:                         
economic performance 
Our analysis also shows that all three groups started at similar rates of trend 
growth. However, countries that undertook ambitious expenditure reform ex-
perienced more favourable trend output developments.20 Chart 6 shows that in 
the seven years following the expenditure peak, trend growth picked up in both 
                                           
20  Note that within the framework of our analysis we do not intend to identify a causal rela-
tionship between expenditure retrenchment and supply-side or growth effects. The better 
growth performance may be due to expenditure reform, other complementary reform, or as 
we see as most likely, a combination of the two. Nevertheless, the differences are striking 
(on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal adjustments in OECD countries, see Alesina and 
Perotti 1997). 
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ambitious reform groups leading to an average improvement of 1.3% (more than 
1.5% for the late reformers). At the same time, trend growth stayed broadly sta-
ble for the “timid” reformers. Note also that it took 4 years until trend growth 
improved markedly in the early and ambitious reform category.  
 
Source: Ameco 
We also distinguished between small and large countries to see whether the dy-
namics on the supply-side and growth  are correlated with country size.21 Chart 7 
displays that for small countries ambitious reform phases coincided with a faster 
pick-up in trend growth. Also, the overall improvement within the reform period 
was stronger in the small and ambitious category. For these episodes, trend 
growth rates, on average, increased by nearly 2 percentage points within seven 
years. In contrast, for large economies we observe a more lagged and substan-
tially lower overall rise in trend growth rates, amounting to 1 percentage point. 
Furthermore, we analyzed employment developments and found that, on aver-
age, all three groups experience improvements in the employment ratio within 
seven years. This increase was largest for late and ambitious reformers which 
experienced an increase of almost 7 percentage points.  
When assessing the effects of fiscal consolidation in the short run, actual growth 
as well as private investment and consumption are key. Actual growth was be-
low trend in all three groups and averaged only 0.3% as most countries started 
reforms in periods of low growth or even crisis. Subsequently, in almost all 
countries that undertook ambitious reforms, output growth recovered quickly 
and faster than for timid reformers. We find some indication that positive confi-
dence effects may have been rather strong (and for consumption also immediate) 
                                           
21  This is of course a very crude examination and can only give very “preliminary and illus-
trative” evidence. Canada, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK are the “large” economies 
amongst the group of ambitious reformers while the group of “small” countries contains 
Belgium, Finland, Ireland and Sweden. 
Box 2: Trend GDP growth 
Chart 6: Reform ambition and trend growth
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Chart 7: Reform ambition and trend growth, large vs. small countries
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in the group of ambitious reformers and possibly contributed to the quick growth 
rebound. Chart 8 and 9 in Box 3 show the development of private investment 
and consumption for the different reform categories.  
 
     Source: Ameco 
With a lag, private investment started growing strongly for early and, 
particularly, late ambitious reformers with investment ratios catching up with 
the “timid” reform group. The development in real private consumption is also 
interesting. Ambitious reforms appear to start after a period of low consumer 
confidence. Consumption growth, however, recovers quickly and exceeds that of 
timid reformers as of the first reform year.  
4.5 Comparing ambitious and timid reformers:                          
testing for differences 
In order to underpin the findings from the preceding horizontal analysis we also 
carried out a standard statistical test for differences in post-reform developments 
concerning “ambitious” and “timid” reform phases. Again, we focus on changes 
within a seven year reform period. Table 7 reports the results for Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests. 
First of all, these tests further confirm the “higher quality” of ambitious expendi-
ture retrenchment efforts. While reductions in government consumption and 
transfers and subsidies are significantly higher within the ambitious reform cate-
gory, there is no evidence for a stronger reliance on cuts in government invest-
ment. When assessing the effects of expenditure-based consolidation on the 
soundness of fiscal policies we do not find significant differences in the underly-
ing deficit and debt developments. While the results for debt are in line with the 
findings from Section III.3, the missing significance for the change in fiscal bal-
ance is somewhat surprising. Nevertheless, the reported p-value is close to the 
  Box 3: Private investment and real private consumption 
Chart 8: Reform ambition and private investment
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Chart 9: Reform ambition and change in real private consumption
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10% significance level and, moreover, the result seems to be driven by an influ-
ential observation.22 
As regards economic performance, the picture, again, becomes more clear-cut. 
The tests yield strong support for differences in trend growth developments, as 
growth rate improvements tend to be significantly larger for ambitious reform pe-
riods. We also find partial confirmation on potential confidence effects. While 
private investment changes do not turn out to be significant, we observe that ex-
penditure-based consolidation efforts tend to coincide with more favourable de-
velopments in real private consumption when carried out in an ambitious manner.     
Table 7:  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test  
 for differences between ambitious and timid reform phases 
 p-value significance level1) probability2) 
expenditure developments    
∆3) government consumption 0.00 *** 0.94 (-) 
∆ transfers and subsidies 0.00 *** 0.95 (-) 
∆ government investment 0.46  0.60 (-) 
    
Soundness of fiscal policies    
∆ fiscal balance 0.12  0.72 (+) 
∆ public debt 1.00  0.00 (-) 
    
economic performance    
∆ trend gdp growth 0.00 *** 0.92 (+) 
    
Confidence effects    
∆ private investment 0.16  0.69 (+) 
∆ change in real private consumption 0.02 ** 0.82 (+) 
1) ***/**/* denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
2)   Probability that the reduction (-) or the improvement (+) is larger within the ambitious reform category 
3) Change T0-T7    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
22  When disregarding the low fiscal-balance improvement within the Netherlands’ first re-
form phase we observe a p-value of 0.06. 
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5 Conclusion 
In this paper we have taken a close look at the experiences with expenditure re-
form in industrialised countries with special emphasis on ambitious reform pro-
grams. We have conducted an in-depth analysis of such episodes by examining 
the concrete reform measures undertaken and their effect on total spending and 
expenditure composition. We also looked at the institutional context in which 
these reforms were undertaken, the comprehensiveness of reform programs and 
the economic and fiscal performance in the wake of reforms.  
We found that ambitious reform programs have a number of common features: 
the reduction in total spending is truly ambitious and averages about 10% of 
GDP within seven years. This is achieved by focusing mainly on government 
consumption, transfers and subsidies while mostly sparing spending on educa-
tion. Ambitious expenditure reform was always part of a comprehensive reform 
package that most of the times included labour market reform, tax reform and 
privatisation and, in about half of the episodes, the establishment of monetary 
and external stability. Virtually all episodes of ambitious reform featured the 
strengthening of national and sub-national budgetary procedures and institu-
tions.  
Ambitious reform episodes appear to secure more lasting fiscal consolidation 
than “timid” expenditure reforms while also yielding an important “tax cut pre-
mium”. Ambitious reformers also experience a much more favourable growth 
performance than “timid” countries, which is particularly fast and strong for 
relatively small ambitious countries. Ambitious reformers have also typically 
not experienced significant short term economic costs of retrenchment, despite 
an average adjustment effort of around 3% of GDP in the first two years of re-
form, as consumer and investor confidence picked up rather quickly. When 
looking at the reform programmes and subsequent experiences, there are clear 
signs of significant improvements in the “economic policy regime” in many of 
these countries. 
From a perspective of political economy, it appears that ambitious expenditure 
reform programs have been mainly implemented in the context of recession or 
even economic crises. This contrasts with the call of many economists and poli-
ticians to limit consolidation to good times (where the urgency of reform is, 
however, hardly felt).  
Lastly, it appears that a medium term comprehensive strategy with emphasis on 
expenditure adjustment is rightly warranted not least from the perspective of the 
euro area and the recently reformed Stability and Growth Pact. Concerns about 
ambitious reforms undermining economic growth appear unfounded. The case 
studies in particular demonstrate that fiscal adjustment can and should be more 
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ambitious than the 0.5% of annual improvement in the cyclically adjusted budg-
etary balance, as required by the medium-term budgetary objective under the 
revised pact. Claims to the effect that more ambitious efforts would require tax 
increases appear unfounded. One could even speculate that more rather than less 
expenditure retrenchment seems desirable to achieve lasting fiscal consolidation 
and economic revival. Also assertions that structural reforms would justify a de-
lay in adjustment appear equally dubious as successful reformers undertook 
comprehensive reforms more or less simultaneously with fiscal adjustment. 
Concluding on a note of caution, it is worth stressing that this study looks at the 
changes in spending ratios since their peak and their correlation with other re-
forms and with fiscal and economic performance from a case study perspective. 
While the ambitious and timid group’s experiences are significantly different (as 
suggested by relevant tests), we do not establish causality between reforms and 
performance, for which much further analysis would be warranted.  
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Annex Table 1: Robustness of Categorisation (cumulative change primary expenditure from T0 or nearest, % of GDP) 
  
 T0 Change T0-T1 Change T0-T2 Change T0-T3 Change T0-T4 Change T0-T5 Change T0-T6 Change T0-T7 Change T0-T8 
fin 1993 -1.0 -4.6 -4.7 -8.0 -10.9 -11.2 -14.0 -13.7 
swe 1993 -2.7 -6.1 -8.5 -10.5 -12.0 -11.7 -14.0 -13.4 
irl1 1982 -0.5 -2.1 -3.6 -3.3 -4.8 -7.4 -12.4 -12.1 
bel1 1983 -3.3 -4.7 -5.7 -7.0 -8.8 -11.7 -12.3 -10.5 
can 1992 -1.0 -3.4 -5.2 -6.7 -8.3 -8.0 -9.5 -10.8 
gbr1 1981 -1.2 -1.5 -1.8 -3.5 -4.4 -6.2 -8.2 -8.5 
nld2 1993 -2.0 -4.1 -5.6 -6.6 -7.2 -7.2 -7.5 -5.7 
gbr2 1992 -0.8 -1.9 -2.6 -4.3 -6.1 -7.3 -7.2 -6.8 
esp 1993 -1.4 -2.8 -4.3 -5.8 -5.9 -6.5 -6.4 -6.8 
irl2 1992 0.3 0.1 -2.0 -3.2 -4.9 -6.8 -6.2 -8.2 
lux 1981 -2.4 -3.1 -6.1 -7.1 -7.9 -5.7 n.a. n.a. 
nld1 1983 -1.3 -2.7 -3.1 -1.9 -3.6 -5.3 -5.1 -5.3 
aut 1993 -0.3 -0.3 -1.0 -3.1 -2.8 -2.8 -4.3 -5.3 
dnk 1993 0.4 -0.2 -0.5 -2.1 -2.0 -2.5 -3.9 -2.8 
nzl 1985 n.a. -4.2 -2.3 -3.4 -1.6 -3.6 -3.8 -6.9 
usa 1992 -0.4 -1.4 -1.6 -2.0 -2.9 -3.5 -3.4 -3.4 
ita 1993 -1.5 -2.8 -2.9 -2.9 -3.0 -2.5 -3.0 -2.0 
jpn 1998 -2.0 0.0 -1.5 -0.8 -1.1 -2.0 -2.7 n.a. 
bel2 1993 -0.7 -0.9 -0.4 -1.0 -1.4 -1.5 -2.1 -1.6 
deu 1996 -0.9 -1.3 -1.0 -1.7 -1.5 -0.9 -0.6 -2.0 
fra 1996 -0.4 -1.5 -1.4 -2.3 -2.3 -1.3 -0.5 -0.3 
che 1998 -1.5 -2.0 -1.1 -0.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
prt 2004 0.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
grc 2000 -0.5 -0.5 0.2 0.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
aus 1985 -0.5 -2.6 -4.2 -3.9 -2.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 
 
  45  
Annex Table 2: Robustness of Categorisation (cumulative change cyclically adjusted primary expenditure from T0 or nearest, 
% of GDP) 
  
 T0 Change T0-T1 Change T0-T2 Change T0-T3 Change T0-T4 Change T0-T5 Change T0-T6 Change T0-T7 Change T0-T8 
fin 1993 -0.3 -3.6 -3.4 -6.0 -8.6 -8.9 -11.5 -11.7 
swe 1993 -2.2 -5.3 -7.8 -9.8 -11.0 -10.4 -12.4 -12.1 
irl1 1982 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
bel1 1983 -3.2 -4.5 -5.5 -6.8 -8.1 -10.8 -11.3 -9.7 
can 1992 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
gbr1 1981 -1.2 -1.5 -1.8 -3.4 -4.2 -5.9 -7.8 -8.1 
nld2 1993 -1.9 -3.9 -5.2 -5.8 -5.8 -5.3 -5.3 -3.9 
gbr2 1992 -0.8 -1.8 -2.4 -4.1 -5.9 -7.1 -6.9 -6.6 
esp 1993 n.a. n.a. -1.5 -2.8 -2.7 -3.1 -2.7 -3.2 
irl2 1992 -0.2 -0.5 -2.2 -3.2 -4.4 -6.3 -5.3 -7.2 
lux 1981 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
nld1 1983 -0.7 -1.9 -2.0 -1.0 -2.6 -3.4 -2.7 -3.1 
aut 1993 -0.3 -0.3 -1.0 -3.1 -2.7 -2.7 -4.1 -5.2 
dnk 1993 1.4 0.5 0.5 -0.9 -0.8 -1.1 -2.1 -1.3 
nzl 1985 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
usa 1992 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
ita 1993 -1.5 -2.7 -2.9 -2.8 -2.9 -2.4 -2.8 -1.8 
jpn 1998 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
bel2 1993 -0.5 -0.7 -0.3 -0.8 -1.2 -1.0 -1.4 -1.1 
deu 1996 -2.0 -3.2 -2.6 -4.6 -4.3 -3.2 -2.2 -3.0 
fra 1996 -0.3 -1.2 -1.1 -1.8 -1.8 -0.9 -0.3 -0.1 
che 1998 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
prt 2004 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
grc 2000 -0.4 -0.5 0.3 0.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
aus 1985 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
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Annex 3: Breakdown of expenditure and complementary reforms by episode 
  Ireland 
1 
Ireland 
2 
Sweden Canada Finland Belgium 
1 
Nether 
lands 1 
Nether 
lands 2 
Spain UK 1 UK 2 Total 
Public wage restraint X X X X X X X X X X X 11 
Public employment reductions X  X  X     X X 5 
Transfers 1: tightened eligibility X X X X X X X X X X X 11 
Transfers 2: reduced benefits X  X X X X X X X X X 10 
Transfers 3: co-payments / user charges X       X   X 3 
Expenditure reduction by at least 1% of 
GDP: 
            
    Subsidy cuts   X  X X    X  4 
    Investment X X    X   X  X 5 
    Education    X X X X     4 
    Health X   X X       3 
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    Pensions  X X  X   X    4 
Strengthening the Minister of Finance X  X      X X X 5 
Fiscal contracts  X   X  X X X   5 
Fiscal council       X X X   3 
Improved parliamentary control over 
budget 
  X  X        2 
Multi-year budget planning  X X  X    X X X 6 
Expenditure ceilings   X X X   X X  X 6 
Deficit/surplus rule   X    X   X  3 
‘carry-over’ provisions or contingency 
funds 
  X X        2 
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Maastricht convergence/external anchor  X X  X   X X   5 
Exchange rate devaluation /depreciation X X X  X    X  X 6 
Central bank independence  X X  X  X X X  X 7 
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Monetary stabilisation X X X  X X X X  X  8 
Privatisation and public-private partner-
ships 
X  X X X X    X X  7 
Reforms to the benefit system X X X X X X X X X X X 11 
Pension reform   X  X    X   3 
Labour Market reforms  X X X X X X X X X X 10 
Tax reform/cuts X X X X X  X X X X X 10 
Wage-setting reform X     X      2 
Wage moderation X X   X  X     4 
S
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Financial sector reform    X X    X X  4 
 
 
